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Social Partnership in Germany: 
Lessons for U.S. Labor and Management 
by Lowell Turner 
G erman industrial relations in the postwar period have made a 
major contribution to Ger-
man industrial success. The 
German system is rooted in 
the explicit recognition of 
well organized interests: 
strong, assertive employers 
and employers' associations 
not afraid to demand what 
they think is right, including 
wage restraint as well as 
reorganization of production 
toward "lean production"; 
and strong, assertive unions 
not afraid to demand what 
they think is right, including 
broad skills training, high 
wages, a shorter workweek, 
and a "human-centered" 
work organization. Amazing-
ly, these strong forces end 
up with negotiated outcomes 
in a system that is accurately 
called "social partnership." 
GERMANY'S SOCIAL 
PARTNERSHIP 
Social partnership is based 
not on the assumption of 
harmony, which can sup-
press good ideas as well as 
conflicts, but rather on the 
assumption that conflicting 
interests in society and in the 
firm should be organized and 
have a voice with clear 
rights. This organization 
should take place within 
structures that facilitate the 
resolution of conflicts in the 
building of consensus. These 
structures include compre-
hensive collective bargaining 
and codetermination at the 
level of the firm. 
This system is not conflict-
free. In the Spring of 1993 in 
eastern Germany, the em-
ployers' association in the 
metalworking industry, 
Gesamtmetall, unilaterally 
abrogated the three-year con-
tract signed in 1991 to bring 
eastern workers up to nomi-
nal wage parity with western 
workers by 1994. On April 1, 
1993, the employers began 
paying about one-third of the 
scheduled raise. They took 
this step because of high unit 
labor costs in the east and 
because they could not resist 
the temptation to go for a win 
in eastern Germany's mass 
unemployment labor market 
(40 to 50 pe rcen t in real 
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terms). The union in the metalworking industry, IG 
Metall, responded with a highly effective escalating 
strike. 
The eastern metalworkers began with warning 
strikes on April 1 and 2 and again on April 14 and 
15. In a warning strike, workers walk off the job for 
twenty minutes, two hours, or half a day and 
demonstrate, presenting an impressive showing for 
the evening news. Then they return to work to see 
if there is movement on negotiations. 
The warning strikes unfolded with a breadth and 
depth that stunned the employers (who expected 
only weak and hesitant support given the existing 
mass unemployment) and surprised the union 
(which feared the same response and took this ini-
tial action with its fingers crossed). The union's 
strategic gamble paid off. Many eastern workers, 
angry about the dislocation and false promises of 
unification, channeled their passion into these job 
actions in April. Strike votes across eastern Germany 
showed 80 to 90 percent support for a strike, and 
on May 3 the union began to target selected firms in 
key regions. In the following two-week period, the 
number of strikers grew from 30,000 to 100,000. 
The two sides then reached a compromise agree-
ment, which eastern metalworkers voted over-
whelmingly to ratify. Under the agreement, they got 
their 1993 raises, but not in full until December 1, 
and they will not reach wage parity until 1996. In 
addition, there is a new "hardship clause" that 
allows individual employers to apply to a joint 
employer-union commission for temporary wage 
relief. 
The day before the first warning strikes, I was in 
the offices of the employers' association in Berlin 
getting their side of the story. I told the head of the 
economics department that I would soon be talking 
with the members of the National Planning 
Association's Committee on New American Realities. 
Should I tell them, I asked, that social partnership in 
Germany is dead? "No, no!" he replied. "Tell them 
all about social partnership. We are fighting to pre-
serve social partnership, to adjust the costs to make 
it work." That was his message. 
The successful outcome of the strike achieved 
important goals: (1) it preserved the principle of 
widespread patterned collective bargaining whereby 
both employers and unions take labor costs out of 
competition within the German market; (2) it consid-
erably strengthened the union's position in the new 
eastern arena; (3) it strengthened employers' com-
mitment to the employers' association in the east; 
and (4) it reinforced the integration of workers from 
the failed communist system into the German "social 
market" economy. The conflict served a significant 
social purpose that in the long run will contribute to 
industrial relations stability in unified Germany. 
In spite of this large strike and others like it from 
time to time, Germany has had a far lower strike 
rate throughout the postwar period than most other 
industrial societies, including the United States. 
Even if the system is not conflict-free, when a rare 
strike occurs it tends to be large in numbers, to be 
short in duration, and to play a significant, construc-
tive role in the German economy. This is especially 
important to keep in mind now as German industry, 
under the impact of unification, recession, and 
intensified global competition, experiences a period 
of uncertainty, cost cutting, and new labor-manage-
ment tension. Some say the model is in big trouble. 
But social partnership is resilient. German firms and 
unions will likely come through the current difficul-
ties with renewed vigor, as they have in the past. 
LEARNING FROM THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
What can be learned not just from the recent con-
flict but from the past 40 years of German experi-
ence? Many firms have had difficulty trying to 
import a certain lesson from a certain country (e.g., 
the team concept from Japan) or from another firm 
or industry. Although it is difficult to transfer lessons 
from abroad, the first lesson to come from Ger-
many's system of industrial relations is that social 
partnership works. A thumbnail definition of social 
partnership would be: first, interests are organized; 
second, there are legally defined structures for dia-
logue, negotiation, and exchange of information; 
and third, these structures encourage relations of 
partnership. Also, social partnership exists at the 
national, regional, firm, and workplace levels. These 
levels are interdependent and mutually reinforcing; 
the partnership is not very successful at any one 
level unless it is working at all of them. Finally, 
social partnership is a win-win system for compa-
nies, unions, the workforce, and the economy as a 
whole. It is particularly appropriate for high perfor-
mance workplaces as a way to bring everyone on 
board for restructuring and new work arrange-
ments. But social partnership does not succeed 
because of good intentions or good personal rela-
tionships and trust, although these are important. It 
succeeds because of an institutional infrastructure 
that encourages and facilitates the system. 
American managers today can frequently be heard 
saying: "Our employees are our most important 
asset. We finally figured that out, and now we're 
changing our ways." For their part, union officials 
often say: "Well, we've learned that we have to 
work with—not against—management. We didn't 
used to think this way, but we finally realized that 
we would all sink together if we didn't change." 
These enlightened people then talk about their good 
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"Two general lessons, then, can be learned from 
Germany's social partnership. . . . New relations are 
needed. . . . and structural reforms are needed." 
personal relationships at the workplace and how the 
relationships have helped to transform the firm. 
The new approaches, valuable as they may be, are 
not enough. Personal relationships break down. 
People come and go. Formal structures are neces-
sary to reinforce the new relationships—structures 
like those found in the innovative labor-manage-
ment programs taking place at Xerox, AT&T, and 
Saturn. Yet even these innovations are not sufficient 
because they can easily become isolated cases. 
Social partnership requires societywide institutions 
that promote and reinforce the new relationships 
throughout the economy, not just at individual firms. 
Two general lessons, then, can be learned from 
Germany's social partnership. The first is that new 
relationships are needed that stress trust, informa-
tion sharing, dialogue, and a spirit of partnership 
that does not suppress interests. The second lesson 
is that structural reforms are needed that encourage 
the new attitudes and relationships. The emphasis 
must be on structural reform. Enough people have 
concluded that American industry faces so many 
problems that structural reform now appears possi-
ble. The current deliberations of the Dunlop 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations are a good beginning. 
Two examples follow of specific areas where 
reforms in the United States can be undertaken 
based on the German experience. 
Lessons from Vocational Training 
The first area is vocational training. Secretary of 
Labor Robert B. Reich and many others emphasize 
the importance of getting the U.S. workforce trained 
for the 21st century, with frequent reference to the 
German system of apprenticeship training. The 
Germans have a highly skilled workforce; about 
two-thirds have completed an almost three-year 
apprenticeship. In fact, there are so many skilled 
German workers (despite shortages in particular 
areas) that there are not enough skilled jobs avail-
able. Trained workers often have to take jobs that 
are less skilled than they are qualified for, which 
nonetheless provides flexibility and the potential for 
further learning throughout the economy. 
The way that training is viewed in the United 
States is a problem. Training is encouraged as a 
matter of public policy, with incentives provided to 
employers to train without addressing whether there 
will be appropriate jobs for those who are trained. 
This view becomes especially problematic given the 
current drive toward lean production, downsizing, 
and cost-cutting. It is necessary to ask, therefore, if 
American workplaces are being reorganized in ways 
that can take advantage of new generations of 
trained workers. 
The German system provides one answer in its 
expanded commitment to vocational training, which 
works because it is tied to a broad program of 
social partnership rather than being an isolated pro-
gram. Germany has boards at the national, regional, 
and local levels made up of employers, govern-
ment, and labor that develop guidelines for training, 
costs, incentives, regional differences, and other 
standards. Employers greatly favor this system 
because they receive significant support for their 
training and work reorganization needs. 
The message for the United States, then, is to 
make vocational training part of a broad package of 
new social partnership relations. An expanded train-
ing commitment should be tripartite, involving 
employers, unions, and government, in assessing 
the future of industry, the future of the shopfloor, 
and the areas of future job growth. Economic policy 
mechanisms or institutions should be developed 
that encourage employers, with union support, to 
reorganize the workplace to make use of new skills, 
technology, and organizational forms such as teams 
that function best with skilled workers. 
Lessons from the Works Council 
The second specific example from the German 
system is the works council—the key German insti-
tution that integrates labor into management con-
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cerns and planning. Codetermination at the supervi-
sory board is also important, but the board meets 
only a few times a year. The works council is where 
"the rubber meets the road" in German codetermi-
nation—where employee representatives and man-
agement daily interact and where the real input 
occurs. Works councils in the United States could 
be developed as structures for permanent, ongoing 
firm- and plant-level employee involvement, facili-
tated directly by government policy throughout the 
economy (as opposed to the recent Electromation, 
Inc., National Labor Relations Board decision or at 
least very ambiguous NLRB cases). 
The European Community as a whole, as well as 
specific countries such as Denmark, Spain, and 
Hungary, has various models of works councils in 
place from which Americans can learn. But the 
United States needs a U.S. version of the works 
council, not a transplant of another country's model. 
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. 
THROUGH EPCs 
One possible approach in the United States would 
be the Employee Participation Committee (EPC). 
There are many versions, including a Weiler ver-
sion, a Freeman and Rogers version, and a Cohen-
Rosenthal version. 
The general format involves establishing, under 
new labor law, firm-level committees in all union 
and nonunion workplaces with, for example, 50 or 
more employees. EPCs would be elected by all 
employees, blue and white collar, including middle 
management. They would have specific rights and 
obligations, particularly rights to regular meetings 
with top management and access to full information 
on company plans. They would be required to 
respect the confidentiality of sensitive business 
information and to work in the best interests of the 
company. 
EPCs would not have the right to engage in col-
lective bargaining or job actions such as strikes. But 
they would have the right to be consulted about 
company plans, especially in areas concerning per-
sonnel. In essence, EPCs would facilitate the partici-
pation of elected employee representatives in man-
agement decisionmaking on matters of importance 
from strategic planning to shopfloor improvements. 
This type of structure, conducive to social partner-
ship, could spread the exciting kinds of innovations 
that are under way in this country with, for example, 
AT&T and the Communications Workers of America 
and the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, and with Xerox and the Amalgamated 
Clothing & Textile Workers' Union. 
A POLICY PACKAGE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
Reforms like expanded vocational training and 
employee participation will work best if they are 
part of a broad package of labor market policy and 
industrial relations reform. They will not work as 
well if they are put in place individually. Yet such a 
fragmented approach toward policy is typical in the 
United States. Americans have a charge-in, fix-it 
mentality and do not draw the necessary linkages 
among programs, policies, and institutions. 
Considerable thought and analysis are needed to 
develop a package of mutually reinforcing industrial 
relations reforms suitable for the United States. This 
will be an important charge for the Dunlop Com-
mission. Indiscriminately transplanted foreign mod-
els will not work. Just-in-time, for example, will not 
succeed in the United States when close relation-
ships with suppliers do not exist. The team concept 
should not be shoved down the throats of reluctant 
employees or supervisors who do not want it. A 
new apprenticeship system that is not linked to a 
broader social partnership approach may not pro-
duce desired results. 
Reform becomes politically possible through 
tradeoffs. In a nascent system of social partnership, 
both sides in the labor-management relationship 
take the risk of change in return for the opportunity 
for major gains. If a policy package like this works, 
unions will be able to participate in EPCs in union-
ized workplaces and in the development of voca-
tional training programs. They will be able to seek 
union recognition and representation in a less 
adversarial climate. 
Employers will receive major input from a highly 
motivated and committed workforce at relatively 
low cost. They will be able to work with partner-
ship-oriented unions. They will get a substantial 
government-backed commitment to skills training. 
Reform is possible, but only if the United States is 
attentive to its own conditions. The crucial problem 
is to develop the specifics of structural reform that 
will work in the U.S. context and make the package 
politically viable. A majority coalition for reform is 
necessary; a reform package will not succeed unless 
substantial segments of both business and labor 
support it. This will require risk-taking, tradeoffs, 
and trial-and-error negotiation initiated by labor, 
business, and government, by all those who are not 
satisfied with the current industrial relations climate 
in this country, and by all those who think that 
labor and management together can make a better 
contribution to the competitiveness of American 
industry. It is exciting that a beginning is being 
made in this dialogue and that meaningful reform is 
on the agenda. An American version of social part-
nership is what America needs. 
